Влияние корпоративных конфликтов на эффективность управления персоналом в России: на примере нефтяных компаний
Диссертация
Kerr, 1975]. Стимулирующие контракты в системе корпоративного управле3 ния были проанализированы в рамках обзоров Алмазана и Суареза, Бебчука и Фрайда, Берковича и пр., Дикса, Доу и Рапозо, Гиббонса и Мэрфи, Хольмстрома, Андрэда и пр., Шарфстайна, Буркарта и Рафф, Иппо-лито. Международная практика использования стимулирующих контрактов подробно представлена в исследованиях Дженсена и Мэрфи, Брюса… Читать ещё >
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