Развитие организационно-экономических отношений в современной России
Диссертация
В этой связи одной из фундаментальных предпосылок современного кризиса является целевая функция развития бизнеса, которая за последние полтора-два десятилетия претерпела серьезную трансформацию. Стремление к максимальной капитализации, ставшее ключевым ориентиром развития корпораций, вступает в противоречие с реальным основанием социально-экономического прогресса — с повышением производительности… Читать ещё >
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