Organizational — technical maintenance of systems of information security

Organizational — technical maintenance of systems of information security

The Ministry of Education and Sciences of Ukraine.

National Aviation University.

The homework (part 1) on discipline: «Organizational — technical maintenance of systems of information security».

Variant 3 (1 402 053).

Executed by:

student of 401 FTIS group.

Sergiy Gnatyuk.

Checked by:

docent of CMIS.

Volodymyr Temnikov.

_____ _______.

mark signature.

KYIV — 2005.

The task:

Object of protection — warehouses in the protected territory with a gate for a fare of transport and pass of employees. In immediate proximity from a protection territory there are an automobile line (this part it agrees with the received task).

*On my discretion (according to the task), i specify, that this warehouse belongs to huge firm which is closely connected with information technologies, personal computers and their accessories (that is presence of some automated system — AS). It is my personal interpretation, and also specification of the task !!!

The contents:

The purposes and assignments of complex information security…

General characteristics of protected object…

The analysis of the processable information…

Revealing of channels of information leakage…

Development of model of threats and models of the infringe…

The analysis of security of the allocated object…

Development of model of threats and infringer…

Planning of protective actions by kinds of threats…

Report…

The list of the used literature…

Performance of work.

The purposes and assignments of complex information security.

For consideration of information protection (IP) problem in a general view we shall allocate in its subject domain three following hierarchies: structural, cause effect and functional.

The ways of IP depend on type of the information, the form of its storage, processing and transfer, the type of a data carrier, and also a prospective way of an attack and its consequences on influence on the information (copying, distortion, destruction).

Basically the owner of the information does not know where when and how the attack will be carried out, therefore it is necessary for him to find out the fact of an attack.

Definition of potential value of the information allows thinking first of all of safety of the most important secrets which outflow is capable to damage. Thus it is important to establish.

What information requires protection?

Whom can it interest?

What elements of the information are the most valuable?

What «term of a life» of these secrets?

How many moneys their protection will be cost?

Experience of application of systems IP (SIP) shows that effective can be only complex system of information protection (CSIP), combining the following measures:

Legislative. Use of the acts regulating the rights and duties of physical and legal persons, and also the states in area of IP.

Moral — ethical. Creation and maintenance on object of such moral atmosphere in which infringement of regulated rules of behavior would be estimated by the majority of employees sharply negatively.

Physical. Creation of physical obstacles for access of extraneous persons to the protected information.

Administrative. The organization of a corresponding mode of privacy, a carrying and internal mode.

Technical. Application of electronic and other devices for IP.

Cryptographic. Application of enciphering and coding for concealment of the processable and transmitted information from the non-authorized access.

Program. Application of software of differentiation of access.

The proved choice of a required level of protection of the information is system-making problem as both understating, and overestimate of a level conducts to losses. Thus recently the role of the given question has sharply increased because, firstnow in number protected besides military, state and departmental, secrets industrial, commercial and even personal, and second are included also, the information is more and more becomes the goods. Thus, parameters of two kinds are necessary for an estimation of the information:

describing the information as a resource providing activity of a society,.

describing the information as object of work.

Means of protection are possible to divide on constantly acting and turned when the attack detected. On activity they share on passive, semi active and active. On level of maintenance IP means of protection are subdivided into 4 classes: systems of weak protection (1 class), systems of strong protection, systems of very strong protection, systems of special protection.

The complex system of protection of the information should include the following concepts — multizone and multiboundary. Multizone provides differential authorized access of various categories of employees and clients to sources of the information and is realized by expansion of space, which borrows object of protection, on so-called controllable zones. Typical zones of the control:

Territory which borrows protected object (external controllable zone),.

Buildings in the this territory (controllable zone of territory),.

Corridors or floors indoors (a zone of a premise),.

Cabinets, departments, laboratories (zone of resources),.

Safes, cases, storehouses in which the information is stored (the zone of databases).

Multiboundary will have in that case the following kind:

Border of protection of territory,.

Border of protection of buildings and premises,.

Border of protection of means and resources (the major),.

Border of protection of communication lines within the limits of one premise,.

Border of protection of communication lines within the limits of territory.

Complex system problems of protection of the information.

Management of access of users to resources of the automated system (AS) with the purpose of protection against wrongful intervention in work of system and the non-authorized access to the information.

Protection of the data transmitted on liaison channels.

Registration, gathering, storage and processing of all data that safety concern.

The control of work of users of system over managers and the operative notification of managers of safety about attempts of the non-authorized access to resources of system.

The control and supporting integrity of critical resources.

Maintenance of the closed environment of the software with the purpose of protection against uncontrolled introduction in system of viruses and other potentially dangerous programs.

Management of means of system of protection.

Thus, in an introductory part of the project we have considered the main aspects which should be taken into account at creation of complex information safety. In creation of universal system of protection we shall consider more concrete steps after the detailed analysis of threats and channels of information leakage.

2. General characteristics of protected object.

. The analysis of the processable information.

And so, we have a warehouse which belongs to the big firm which is engaged in information technologies. This implies, that there is enough expensive production and as consequence demands quite good protection by means.

Valuable things which are on object and demand protection (detailed elaboration of the bottom level of protection):

The information about firm’s activity, the sheet about incomes (profit and loss) of the enterprises, the information about trade channels of the goods and others,.

The information about employees of the enterprise, their private affairs (addresses, phones), contracts and the labor contracts made by workers with the enterprise (wages, post, some aspects that concern carried out work).

The equipment and PC completing, which are the basic subjects in a warehouse.

Thus, we determine the presence of subjects which is necessary for protecting on a workstation of the director.

The next stage will be revealing channels of information leakage. But before proceeding to the analysis of channels of information leakage and possible means of their liquidations, it is necessary to take the following in attention: total cost of means of protection of the information should not exceed actual cost of the information!

. Revealing of channels of information leakage.

The channel of information leakage (CIL) is a physical way from a source of a signal up to the malefactor on which means reception of protected data is possible.

To reveal channels of information leakage it is necessary to consider in details all possible channels and to choose what approach in our case.

Technical channels of information leakage can be divided into the following types:

radio channels (electromagnetic radiations of the radio-range),.

acoustic channels (distribution of sound fluctuations to anyone voice-conducting material),.

electric channels (dangerous voltage and currents in various current-carrying communications),.

optical channels (electromagnetic radiations in an infra-red, seen and ultra-violet part of a spectrum),.

material channels (a paper, a photo, magnetic carriers, waste products, etc.).

Proceeding from set forth above channels, we can reveal channels of information leakage which concern to our case:

Radio channel.

Interception of waves of electromagnetic radiation (for example reading of the information from the screen of a computer, microphone effect, a parasitic feedback and others).

The acoustic channel.

The infringer can intercept sound waves when doors are open, windows, through ventilating shafts, pipes of water supply, air-conditioning …

The electric channel.

Possible interception of the information through circuits of grounding, power supplies both parasitic capacitor and electromagnetic communications.

The optical channel.

First, are applications of the elementary subjects of home appliances for supervision on distance (the field-glass, a telescope, a camera).

Second, is an application of special technical equipment which intercepts signals from liaison channels. Thus the transmitter is directly on object, and the receiver in hands of the infringer.

Material channels.

First, is an analysis of different waste products which the malefactor can find in garbage baskets, tanks for technological waste products.

Second, is electronic information which the infringer can take from automated systems (AS) after he will get direct access to system.

In this item of work we have revealed and have analyzed possible channels of information leakage, taking into account a concrete situation which is offered to us in the task. It has been made, that in the following items of work (when we shall create complex protection of the information), we have paid the attention to these channels of information leakage and have prevented loss of the information.

3. Development of model of threats and models of the infringer.

3.1. The analysis of security of the allocated object.

To analyze a level of security of the warehouse, and in particular, information on a computer of the head, it is necessary to consider the schematic image of territory of the warehouse:

Fig.1.The scheme of warehouse’s territory.

After the analyzing in details of given image (the scheme was not given in the task, it is my personal representation of the task), I can draw a conclusion, that there is a big quantity of the unprotected channels through which the information leakage is possible here. These sites require application of additional (technical) means of the information protection:

Doors at entrance on territory of the warehouse and at an entrance in a premise, rooms.

Windows in a building (the infringer can break a window and overhear conversation, make the way over a window and establish the camera or a microphone, to steal the important information).

Communication lines (computer and telephone lines can be considered as potentially probable channels of information leakage).

Monitors of computers are potentially dangerous, vulnerable zones.

Magnetoelectric radiations of the equipment.

The entrance in system also requires protection against selection of passwords and «dictionary attack «.

Telephone sets should be protected from interception.

3.2. Development of model of threats and infinger.

Threats are potentially possible events, processes or the phenomena which can cause to damage of someone" s interests. In relation to owners of the information, threats are potentially probable processes, events or the phenomena which process of influence on the information or its carriers, can directly or indirectly damage interests of these subjects.

Fig.2.Threats of security.

Natural — threats that carry potential danger to the automated system or its elements, means of physical influences or the natural phenomena which do not depend оn the person.

Artificial — threats to the automated system which are caused by direct actions of the person.

Such threats which are caused by mistakes, as failures, the natural phenomena and other influences in designing the automated systems, the software and action of the personnel refer to as casual threats. The threats connected to mercenary interests, ideological or other aspirations of people refer to deliberate.

Конкретные угрозы, которые могут возникнуть:

Penetration to sources грабеж important information.

Switching-off of electricity that will provide technical unfitness of the automated system.

Selection of passwords by a method of «dictionary attack» and, as consequence, receptions of access to the information.

Entering of viruses in system through the Internet or parallel connection to a network, selection IP-addresses …

Illegal connection to channels (interception, peeping) with use of special technical equipment.

Illegal penetration on territory of the warehouse by recruitment of employees of firm.

Illegal penetration on territory of warehouse by physical overcoming barrier (armed attack on the protection agents, the broken windows, the broken locks, doors and others).

I think, that I managed to analyze completely possible threats of safety of the information and it will be very useful to the further development of complex system of safety.

The infringer is a person who has made attempt of performance of the forbidden actions by mistake, not to knowledge, or is realized with malice aforethought (from mercenary interests or without those), for the sake of self-affirmation, pleasure, revenge. The infringer can use various methods and means. If he operates intentionally from mercenary promptings we’ll name his malefactor.

Before us it is a problem necessary to develop model of the infringer, for this purpose it is necessary to determine the following characteristics all over again:

Categories of people to which he can concern.

The assumption of qualification and technical equipment of the possible infringer.

Character of possible actions.

In relation to the automated system, infringers can be internal and external.

Operators, the personnel of the enterprise, the engineer, techniques, system programmers, employees of a protection service of the enterprise, heads of various levels can be internal infringers.

External infringers can be clients of the warehouse, representatives of firms, visitors, electricians, sanitary technicians, cleaners and any persons that have penetrated on territory of the warehouse.

In our case, we can not determine precisely from what categories of people there will be our infringer, therefore we should create such system of security which will include means of an opposition to all set forth above infringers.

In the task to us it is told, that the computer belongs to the head of the large warehouse* is means, that loss of the information from this computer can lead to the big losses at the enterprise.

Taking into account circumstances and the characteristic of the warehouse, the infringer can concern to one of four categories:

The person who knows functional features of the automated system.

The person who possesses a high level of knowledge and an operational experience with means systems and their service.

The person who possesses a high level of knowledge in the field of computer facilities, designing …

The person who knows structure, functions and the mechanism of action of means of protection which will resist to him (!!!).

The person, who is armed, possesses quite good physical preparation and can use way of recruitment of safety agents and overcoming of barrier with the help of the weapon and force to reach the information.

Thus, in this part of work we tried to create the model of possible infringer depending on a structure of the warehouse and its features.

Planning of protective actions by kinds of threats.

In the previous items of work we have analyzed security of object, have revealed channels of information leakage and have developed models of threats and models of infringers that is we needed to plan concrete protective security measures.

Considering that threats are present constantly, I have decided to apply constantly working means of protection of the information.

System of an uninterrupted meal for maintenance of an independent meal in case of switching-off of the electric power.

Check-point at entrance on territory of the warehouse. Thus employees of security service of the warehouse will be involved (or employed from security firms), which problem will be restriction of illegal visitors and downturn of threat of illegal penetration on territory of the warehouse.

Protection of telephone sets (protection of a microphone circuit).

Protection of communication lines (the active indicator of a condition of a line) from parallel connection of listening devices.

The detector of movement XJ413T established in an office building and transmitting signals to security.

The signal system (the high-speed security device) — systematic and complexsafety.

7. The hidden intellectual videocameras of supervision.

Detectors of a beaten glass FG-1000 for detection of destruction of glass designs (windows, doors …).

Now we’ll consider these means of protection in more detail, we shall familiarize with some characteristics of devices and principles of their action:

>>>Protection of a microphone circuit.

This variant of reception of the information is connected to the phenomenon of so-called high-frequency imposing. Thus concerning the general case on the one wire high-frequency fluctuation (frequency more than 150 kHz) moves. Through elements of the circuit of a telephone set even if the tube is not removed, high-frequency fluctuations act on a microphone where are modulated by sound fluctuations. Reception of the information is made concerning the general case through the second wire of a line. The peak detector allows allocating low-frequency bending around for the further amplification and record. The circuit of protection of a telephone set from this method is submitted to the information on fig. 3:

As a modulating element is microphone М1 of a telephone set for its protection it is enough to connect in parallel microphone М1 condenser S1 in capacity 0,01−0,05 мкФ. Thus condenser S1 shunts microphone cap М1 on high frequency. Depth of modulation of high-frequency fluctuations decreases more than in 10 000 times that makes practically impossible the further demodulation.

>>>Detectors of a beaten glass of series FG-1000.

Detectors of a beaten glass of firm C*K (IntelliSense) models FG-1015/1025/1025R/1025Z are intended for contactless detection of damages and destructions of the glazed designs. Devices register the sounds accompanying impact about glass and arising at it beating. Detectors have modern design and can be established on a wall, a window frame or on a ceiling of a protected premise.

Features of detectors FG-1015, FG-1025:

high sensitivity and fidelity of registration,.

digital processing of signals,.

mode of testing,.

the simple control of serviceability,.

stability to false operations,.

registration of the signals coming only from the protected glass,.

simplicity in installation and connection,.

stability to influence of a radio noise.

Detectors can be tested at the distance by means of the simulator of destruction of glass Flex Guard, for example, models FG-701. The simulator reproduces a sound of a broken glass and can be used for testing all caller of a beaten glass of firm C*K.

>>>The hidden intellectual videocameras of supervision.

The most reliable way of reception of the necessary information is the hidden television supervision. As the latent chambers of supervision, basically, use noncase and tiny both black-and-white, and color television chambers. Such videocameras provide the latent videocontrol of office accommodations, a ladder platform, an entrance door, etc. and are absolutely imperceptible, informative and safe way of supervision. These chambers are completed with a lens with the born pupil. Because of the small sizes of an entrance pupil of a lens masking noncase and tiny television chambers can be the most various: in an entrance door, in panels of an intercom, in boards of the fire signal system, in boards and devices of illumination, etc.

The term «the born entrance pupil «(Pin-Hole) apply when the plane of a diaphragm coincides with the entrance pupil which is taking place before a forward lens. In usual lenses the entrance pupil is inside a lens.

In a case when at a lens the entrance pupil is born, reduction of an aperture of an entrance pupil or its arrangement in a plane of any blocking subjects (grids, cracks, etc.) does not result in reduction of a corner of a field of vision of a lens, and only reduces its lightforce. Depending on design features of a concrete lens carrying out of a pupil is carried out on 0, 5−5, 0 mm.

The opportunity of installation on the specified distance before a forward lens of small apertures, grids or cracks also provides the present (true) masking the chamber for carrying out of the latent supervision.

>>>Protection of communication lines (the active indicator of a condition of a line).

The given device not only reveals connection of additional loading, but also, at operation of system of the signal system, translates the device in an active operating mode. This mode allows blocking many radiorelaying devices and the devices intended for automatic record of telephone conversations. The basic circuit of such device is submitted on fig. 4:

The device is collected on 4 microcircuits and 4 transistors. Work of the device is described below. An initial condition: the tube of a telephone set is lowered. A meal of the device is carried out from a telephone line through restrictive resistor R5. Condenser S2 is charged through resistor R5 up to a voltage of stabilization of the stabilitron executed on transistor VT2. From condenser S2 the voltage in size 7−8 V acts on the device for a meal of microcircuits (a point «and»). From the power supply through resistor R6 we are charged condenser SZ. Resistors R6, R7, condenser SZ, light-emitting diode VD3 and transistor VT3 form the circuit of indication of the device. The voltage of a line through diode VD1 such as КД102 acts on the divider of a voltage formed by resistors R1 and R2. The voltage on resistor R2 is limited to transistor VT1 included under the circuit of a stabilitron, up to a voltage of a meal that is necessary for protection of inputs of microcircuits against a high voltage. From a cursor of tuning resistor R2 the voltage of a high level acts on an input of element DD1.1 of microcircuit К561ЛЕ5, forbidding pass of pulses from the generator, is executed a foot on an element of 002.1 microcircuits К561ТЛ1. This generator is executed on the basis of Schmidt" s trigger. At a charge and the category of condenser S1 on an output of the generator there are rectangular pulses. As the charge of condenser S1 occurs through diode VD2 such as КД522, and the category — through resistor RZ on an output of element DD2.1 short positive pulses with frequency followings 1 take place, 5 Hz. The first pulse, going through differentiating chain С4, R4 and element DD2.2, establishes the trigger collected on elements DD1.2, DD1.3, in position, when on an input of element DD2.3 a low level of a voltage. The generator collected on DD2.3, is switched off and on conclusions of 1,8 microcircuits DА1 such as КР1014КТ1 there is a high level. Simultaneously pulses with DD2.1 act on elements DD1.1 and DD1.4. Through DD1.1 pulses do not pass, because from the resistor R2 the high level acts. The zero level removed from resistor R9, moves on inputs of elements DD3.1 and DD3.3 microcircuits К561ЛА7. Therefore the pulses which are taking place through DD1.4, do not pass on DD3.4. Hence, on output DD2.4 there is a logic zero, and transistor VT3 is closed. The voltage of logic unit is removed from a cursor of resistor R2, sufficient for switching element DD1.1 which is carrying out function of the controlled comparator with sensitivity tens a millivolt.

If additional loading is connected to a line by resistance less than 100 whom the voltage in a line will decrease for some size. Also the voltage on a cursor of resistor R2 simultaneously decreases. It results in occurrence on input DD1.1 of the voltage perceived by a microcircuit as a level of logic zero. This level resolves passage of pulses from DD2.1 through DD1.1. As on output DD3.1 high a level pulses pass through key DD3.2. Thus on output DD3.3 too the high level and these pulses pass and through key DD3.4. Prodifferentiated by chain С6, R12 pulses through element DD2.4 act on base of transistor VT3. The transistor opens, and condenser S3 is quickly unloaded through open transistor VT3 and light-emitting diode VD3 which brightly flashes with frequency of 0,5−1 Hz. In breaks between pulses condenser S3 is recharged through resistor R6. As the estimation of a condition of a line occurs under the control of pulses from generator DD2.1 some change of a voltage in a line at the moment of a charge of condenser S3 on work of the device does not affect.

Let" s consider a case when the telephone tube is taken off. Thus resistance of a telephone set is included between plus wire of a line and resistors R11 and R13. The pressure in a line decreases till 5−25 V, т. To, loading of a line will be a telephone set, resistor R13 and resistor R14, shunted small (about 10 Ohm) resistance of microcircuit DA1. The voltage removed from resistor R13, provides a meal of the device through diode VD4 such as КД522. Thus the voltage of a high level from a point of connection of resistors R8, R9 acts on elements DD3.3 and DD3.1. The low level closes key DD3.2. The voltage of logic unit close to a voltage of switching of comparator DD1.4 is removed from a cursor of resistor R9. We allow that to a line it is connected (or additional parallel or consecutive loading which results in reduction of a voltage in a line has been connected). Thus the voltage on a cursor of resistor R9 accepts a level regarded by a microcircuit, as a level of logic zero. Thus pulses with DD2.1 pass through DD1.4, DD3.3 and DD3.4. After differentiating chain С6, R12 and element DD2.4 they act on base of transistor VT3, including light indication. Simultaneously, the first pulse translates the trigger on DD1.2 and DD1.3 in a condition resolving work of the generator on element DD2.3. From an output of the generator short pulses frequency 12−20 kHz act on a key executed on microcircuit DА1. The key starts to be closed and open with frequency of the generator. Thus the signal in a line is modulated by this frequency. It causes expansion of a spectrum of a signal, radiated a radioretransmitter connected in a line. Simultaneously the pressure (voltage) in a line increases till 35−45 V. This is connected by that is consecutive with resistor R13 resistor R14 earlier shunted by key DА1 is included. Increase of a voltage in a line up to such level allows to neutralize the automatic recorders working on a level of a voltage in a line.

That work of this generator did not prevent the analysis of a condition of a line, it is periodically disconnected by switching trigger DD1.2, DD1.3 at the moment of an estimation of a condition of a line. If during an estimation of a condition of a line it is made a decision that the line is free from extraneous connections the circuit is automatically established in an initial condition and passes in an expecting mode with periodic check of a condition of a line.

Resistors are used such as МЛТ-0,125. It is possible to replace diode VD1 on КД105, Д226. It is possible to replace these transistors on КТ3102, КТ503. Microcircuits can be used from series 564 and 1561. Condensers S1, С2 and С3 should be with the minimal current of outflow.

At adjustment of the device frequency of generators of 0,51 Hz and 12−20 kHz by resistors R3 and R10, accordingly is established. At included generator DD2.3 resistor R14 establishes a level of a voltage in a line, equal 35−45V. at which does not occur yet disconnection of the lines. Initial levels of operation of the considered device are established by resistors R2 and R9.

The device is necessary for connecting to a line with observance of polarity.

>>>The detector of movement XJ413T.

The reliable detection, adjustable sensitivity, compact modern design — all these characteristics are inherent in the passive infra-red detector of movement XJ413T firms C*K Systems (fig. 5). The detector is intended for use inside premises and offices. It is easily established on a wall or in a corner of a room.

Features of detector XJ413T:

the size of detection zone is 13×13 m,.

the adjustable counter of pulses,.

the control of the bottom zone,.

convenience of installation,.

additional lenses,.

small dimensions,.

the gauge of intervention,.

it is steady against white light,.

it is steady against a radio noise.

Fig. 5. The detector of movement XJ413T.

The size of a zone of detection of the detector is determined by a lens «a wide corner «and makes 13×13 m. The control of the bottom zone is carried out due to the greater density of the beams directed downwards. Double passive infra-red element with an additional lens such as «a horizontal curtain «allows to avoid false operation of the device in premises (rooms) with pets. By change of number of accounting pulses the detector can be adjusted according to features of surrounding conditions. In the case of the device there is a gauge of intervention (the relay with normal disconnected contacts), a forming alarm signal at opening the case of the detector.

The basic characteristics of device XJ413T:

The size of a detection zone, m…13*13.

Voltage of a meal, V…10—14.

Consumed current (at a voltage of a meal + 12 V), mА… 20.

Target relays:

The relay of intervention, мА/В… 25/24.

The relay of alarm, mА/V… 100/24.

Stability to white light on distance of 3 m not less, кd… 20 000.

Stability to a radio noise in a range of frequencies.

10−1000 МHz, V/m… 30.

Range of working temperatures, С… from 0 до + 49.

Overall dimensions, mm… 73*57*40.

Weight, g… 71.

Sensitivity of the device, normal or high, is established by the crosspiece on a payment. The detection zone will consist of double beams and has distant (22 beams), intermediate (7 beams) and near (4 beams), and also bottom zones (2 beams). Installation of the device is carried out on a wall or in a corner of the room, its installation on universal assembly hinge SMB-10 is possible.

>>>The signal system (the high-speed security device).

The given device with the sound signal system of alarm is developed for operation in rooms and on open air in conditions at influence of an ambient temperature from -30 up to 45 °C, relative humidity of air up to 92%, at temperature 22 °C and atmospheric pressure of air from 200 up to 1000 mm of a mercury column. The considered electronic device is intended for protection of inhabited and industrial premises, offices, warehouses, garages, some constructions and other stationary objects, and also can be adapted to protection of automobiles and other mobile transport, including water.

Power supplies of the security device are carried out from a network of an alternating current by a voltage of 127 and 220 V, frequency of 50 Hz, and also from the independent power supplies having a target voltage of 9 V. As the built — in power supply storage battery GB1 can be used. The security device has the simple electronic circuit collected from accessories of wide application, and simple enough design, it allows repeating it in manufactures of small enterprises and joint-stock companies.

At industrial manufacturing the given device the complete set of delivery includes gauges, BP, the HIT, BE, the block of loudspeakers and the assembly complete set. At manufacturing the security device in conditions of radioamateur laboratory it is possible to recommend two blocks for installation: BP and BE.

The power unit includes in the structure entrance circuits, the network lowering transformer of meal Т1, the rectifier working on capacitor loading and executed on one диодной to assembly, PSN, a target circuit for connection the HIT.

At installation and operation of this security device it is necessary to observe rules of an electro security. It is necessary to remember, that the source of a variable voltage has a high voltage dangerous to a life — 220 V.

The basic electric parameters and characteristics of the high-speed security device.

Rated voltage of a power line of an alternating current, V…220 or 127.

Nominal frequency of a power line of an alternating current, Hz… 50.

Rated voltage of the independent or external power supply of a direct current, V…12.

Limits of change of a voltage of a power line of an alternating current, V… .180…240 or 110…140.

Limits of change of frequency of a power line of an alternating current, %…±1.

Limits of change of a voltage of the independent power supply at which steady work of the device is kept, V…8,5…14.

Factor of nonlinear distortions of a power line of an alternating current, %, no more…12.

Adjustable target stabilized voltage BP, V…2…12.

Instability of a target voltage of a direct current, %, no more… 0, 1.

Amplitude of a pulsation of a target voltage.

direct current, mV, no more … 5.

Voltage of secondary stabilization, V…5.

Factor of stabilization of voltage of a direct current, not less… 100.

Time of operation of the device at disconnection of contacts, s, no more:

S1-S3… 50.

S4. S6… 1.

Generated frequency of a sound signal at work of devices, Hz… 1100.

Quantity of simultaneously protected objects, pieces 2… 10.

Level of pressure of a sound signal at full power and on distance of 1 m from the source of a sound, dB, no more… 110.

The power consumed by the device in the attendant operating mode, mWt, no more… 20.

The capacity consumed by the device at operation of a sound signal, Wt… 20.

Noise immunity of the device at influence.

external electromagnetic field, dB, not less. 100 Resistance of isolation of current carrying parts of the device concerning the metal case, МОm, not less… 15.

Weight of the device in the complete set, KG … 1,6.

Efficiency, %, not less … 80.

Service life of the device, h… 5000.

Probability of non-failure operation of the device at risk of the customer in =0,9, not less… 0,98.

Fig. 6. The basic scheme of the high-speed security device.

After an establishment of the given devices and means of technical protection we shall receive the following picture of security of object:

Fig.7. The scheme of security of the warehouse’s territory.

On the fig. 7 we can see zones which are protected the information against the non-authorized influence of infringers are dangerous and during too time already protected with the help of various means (constantly working).

Report:

Thus, I have finished the creation of complex system of information protection of the allocated object. Step by step, using various means of protection I tried to prevent information leakage through practically all possible channels. I have applied some expensive means of technical protection to realization of the conceived system. Questions can appear, — whether favorably to use such means of protection and does the protected information cost these means. But I think that the means applied by me are capable to provide complex protection of object, and on the account of cost — so, in the task is told*, that the object is located in the large warehouse. It is means, that its incomes it is much more, rather than incomes of the small or average (medium) warehouses and any information leakage can cause huge damage to incomes of the warehouse! On this I think that it is necessary to allocate from the very beginning a part of the budget of the warehouse on creation of complex protection. It is will provide 100% preservation of incomes, information and property of firm. Besides to prevent occurrence of internal infringers, it is necessary to establish strict but fair discipline among employees of the warehouse.

The list of the used literature:

Khoroshko V. A., Chekatkov A. A. Methods and means of the information security — K.: Junior, 2003 — 501 p.

Adrianov V. I., Borodin V. А., Sokolov А. V. «Espionage features» and devices for protection objects and information. The handbook. — Lan`, SPb., 1996.

Adrianov V. I., Sokolov А. V. Security devices for automobiles. — Lan`, SPb., 1997.

Magazine «Security system «- М., Grotek, 1997 .

Maurice J. Bach, The design of the UNIX Operating system.

The konspect of lectures (Braylovskyi N. N.).

Nemeth, G. Snider, S. Sebass, Тrent R. Hein UNIX: management of the system administrator.

Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Records, Computers, and the Rights of citizens. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1973. (I-A1, SFR).

J. Anderson, «Information security in a multi-user computer environment» in Advances in Computers, vol. 12. New York: Academic Press, 1973, pp. 1−35. (I A1, SFR).

J. Martin, Scurity. Accuracy, and Primey in Computer Systems. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973. (I-A1, SFR) I.

D. Redell, «Naming and protection in extendible operating systems» Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, 1974. (Available as M.I.T. Proj. MAC Tech. Rep. TR-140.) (II-B3, III-A, SFR).

D. Ritchie and K. Thompson, «The UNIX time-sharing system» Commun. ACM, vol. 17, pp. 365−375, July 1974. (I-A2, II-C3).

S. Lipner, Chm., «A panel session—Security kernels» in 1974 NCC, AFIPS Conf. Proc., vol. 43, pp. 973−980. (III-B, SFR).