Philosophy and colors

Some philosophers are invited to respond to this statement by saying that he raises a question against those theorists who believe that colors have hidden entities, for example physical microstructures. The control of this answer is that the idea that colors have hidden entities is not a correct theory about the natural concept or the people’s concept of color. This can be plausible, as a theory of what is or should be a reformed concept of color, but not as a theory of what the people’s concept is [3, 8, 17].

A dmittedly, it’s not easy to convince people of the presence of explicit properties. O ne of the problems is that many concepts begin their life as concepts of manifested properties, but then move into more complex concepts. W e are talking about children’s concepts of «horse», «dog», «man», etc. F.

or them, the concept is almost exclusively determined by the corresponding occurrences. H owever, there are more complex examples. T.

ake such concepts as brilliant, dazzling, cheerful, in a person, cheerful, gloomy, picturesque, gloomy, pale, etc. T hese are terms that characteristically relate to phenomena. All of these, we can assume, are explicit properties with the entities they wear on their faces, and are not hidden [29,32,35].

M any properties are not manifested: poisonous, created by the robot, containing water as an integral part coming from Virginia, etc., But some of them are clearly pronounced. T hese include colors. S omeone who teaches color terms and understands how they are used knows what it has to be red for, be blue or some other: it must have that function that the perceiver is able to recognize. R eflecting on how colors are depicted, a thoughtful observer can say that the form of the colors of properties is represented as being, since colored «fillers» spread to the surface of physical bodies (or through volumes, etc.). They are inherent features of physical surfaces (volumes) that propagate over the surface.

I t is too clear that we feel the redness of a mature apple as an objective quality of an apple, reddening is in the objective space as well as the shape, contour, texture of the apple. T his point can be accurately illustrated with quotations of two prominent workers in physiology / color psychology, Goering and Boynton.

G oering, for example, writes: «When we open our eyes in a lit room, we see a variety of spatially extended forms that differentiate or separate from each other through differences in their colors. Colors — this is what fills out the outlines of these forms, this is the material from which visual phenomena are created; Our visual world consists entirely of different colors; and objects, from the point of view of their observation, that is, visible objects, are nothing other than colors of different kinds and forms «[16−19,32−34].

In the same vein, the physiological psychologist Robert Boynton writes in «Color in the contour and object perception»: «From an early age, we can easily recognize the property of objects, usually associated with their surfaces, which we call color. relatively few adults, will doubt that the color is on (or sometimes in) the objects. «[4, 5] In addition, everyone knows about the different nature of how colors appear in different modes, for example, for surfaces of objects such as apples, light spots on screens, volumes such as wine, scattering media such as sky, light sources, such as globes, etc.

T here is one more primary intuition, which is one of the most important. T his is part of the people’s concept, another «first-class intuition,» that colors are presented as qualitative, sensual traits. T his question will doubtless be controversial, but it should not be. T.

he reference to the sensual nature of colors is crucial. T hese qualitative attributes, which are colors, are «sensual» in the broadest sense. T his is not a problem of profound metaphysics.

T he term «sensual» is often used in such a way as to apply to a phenomenal, that is, ontologically subjective qualities. H owever, there is a wider meaning that does not have this obligation. F or the term there is a neutral use.

A n illustration is an example that H.H. Price borrows from Husserl: «When I see a tomato hanging on a vine, then a ripe tomato, hanging on a vine»: it is given to me with its sensual qualities" [38]. T his sound is much better, of course, in German, but in English the point is that tomatoes (preferably still, grapes) and the vine are given in perception with sensual traits. T.

he English understand that with the perception of tomatoes, grapes, etc. T he person is familiar with sensual characteristics. Price recognized that regardless of the theory of perception, and especially, did you think that the perceiver is directly aware of physical objects or sensory representations; a person was familiar with sensory features.

A similar point is made by Evan Thompson [41], although with respect to the term «phenomenal», not «sensual». According to him, research in the field of psychophysics and visual physiology is limited to «phenomenal color structure.» By this term, he means mainly three dimensions of color, known as shade, saturation and lightness, as well as relationships that colors manifest themselves. As he notes, textbooks often classify these properties of color as «subjective phenomena of color» or as signs of «color experience». Thompson prefers to use the term «phenomenal» to describe them, because they are, first of all, peculiarities of how colors appear: «Thus, I intend to use the term» phenomenal «in my older sense, referring to phenomena and not in the present sense subjective «.

Neutral concepts of «sensual» and «phenomenal» are those that can be shared by writers with very different philosophical obligations. This is the concept that Michael uses when he argues that when philosophers turn to the phenomenology of the perception of consciousness, by making claims to the phenomenal nature of experience, they mistakenly accept the intrinsic characteristics of the content of experience for the own characteristics of the experience itself,.

Accordingly, we can represent writers as diverse as Price, Thompson and Tye [38, 41, 42], despite their philosophical differences, as in agreement. There is a neutral sense of «sensual» or «phenomenal», according to which physical objects can possess sensory or phenomenal properties. Most importantly, the color properties that the natural concept of color attributes to physical objects are sensory properties. Of course, a separate question is whether the physical objects have sensory functions, which they are represented as having. The price thinks they do not, but he also believes that another argument is needed to show that this is not the case.

I n conclusion: taking into account the characteristic of the natural concept of color, color is a definite property. W hat kind of this can be indicated, in particular, that it is objective, perceiving-independent, explicit and sensual.

I n addition, the property is one with some kinds of cause-effect forces in relation to the representation of color in perception, recognition and identification of colors. F inally, colors are types of properties that are combined in the characteristic ways of forming structured color arrays with a characteristic three-dimensional character. T hey are properties that, as a group, form an internally bound structure of 4 + 2, built on four unique primary shades: green, red, blue and yellow and associated with a black and white pair.

S ome parts of this characteristic of the natural concept are controversial, for example, statements that colors are manifest and sensual. Some of the most significant parts of a characteristic that have the most far-reaching consequences are not contradictory: these colors have causal powers, as described above, and that collectively form a structured system.

Conclusion.

I t was argued that an adequate consideration of color should, first and foremost, ensure the consideration of the folk concept or the natural concept of color. S uch an account, there is reason to believe, is an illusion of color theory.

S uppose that colors, as we usually think of them, are virtual properties, we are faced with the question of how, if at all, we should adapt our ideas to colors. I f our perception of color is usually associated with «false consciousnesses», what is the correct way to think about colors? T he answer to this question is that for many purposes we must continue to think about them in the same way as always. In the case of color, unlike other cases, false consciousness should be the reason for celebration.

Although for most practical purposes it does not matter that colors are virtual properties, however, there are more theoretical purposes for which we need to develop a more complete account, pluralistic color information. Different elements of the natural color concept reflect the different functions that colors should play. Given these different functions and the fact that there is no property that satisfies all of them, we are open to developing a pluralistic framework in which different color concepts assume different functions. This pluralistic structure creates opportunities for the introduction of objectivist color concepts, but such concepts should stand side by side with the concept of a list of dispositions that refers to how colors are perceived by perceivers and, possibly, with the last phenomenal notion. This is the basis that is necessary to adequately take into account the rich epistemological and socially important roles played by colors.

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