" We had a party, and they had a party, so there were no political contradictions," one counselor said. Others were not sure that party control is the best way to manage the economy, mainly because it distracted everyone from work. One adviser noted that «ordinary Chinese were good», but «party leaders with their public smiles and cold eyes» always organized surveillance. The ubiquitous presence of the secret police was another aspect of the Chinese life of Soviet advisers. One Soviet expert noted: «There has always been at least one guard in my room». In fact, every step of the Soviet citizens at the beginning of the relationship, and after, was carefully monitored. Thus, the concept of Soviet-Chinese friendship at the initial stage was very conditional. Soviet citizens were welcomed in China, but didn’t cause full confidence, on the contrary, they were perceived as strangers.
2.2. The Khrushchev periodSoon after Stalin’s death, the Soviet staff in China began to report that the affairs in the organization of enterprises and the preparations for the development of the Chinese went quite well, despite the lack of coordination with Soviet suppliers at various Chinese enterprises. H owever, because of the redistribution of power in the USSR itself, the Soviet side began to experience management problems with the program of Soviet advisers in China. I.
n June 1954, Nikolai Fedorenko wrote an exhaustive review of the CPSU Central Committee, noting that various ministries of the USSR don’t fulfill their obligations to provide advisers. F or example, the USSR agreed to send 50 geologists to China, but only 21 arrived. S imilarly, although China requested five specialists and four instructors, none of them was sent. Fedorenko came to the conclusion that «the timely dispatch of Soviet specialists to the PRC has a negative impact on the provision of our assistance to the PRC.» He continued: «The Chinese comrades asked to speed up the sending of specialists to the PRC. T herefore, we need to strengthen the control over the ministries so that they quickly send people and send only qualified people as advisers.
& quot;However, the problems continued and were brought to the attention of the CPSU Central Committee from the delegation of the Communist League of Youth (Komsomol), which visited China. A new round of activation of relations began with promises of free drawings and technical documentation, construction of industrial projects and even technologies for nuclear power. H owever, tension was growing on the ground, as Soviet specialists noted that «the Chinese comrades no longer need their help and, therefore, will no longer allow them to participate [in the decision-making process]». Soviet advisers and experts continued to arrive in increasing numbers; Build factories, bridges, railways and even the Academy of Sciences.
T hey restructured education, health care, science, that is, they were representatives of the experience of the USSR, which was already transferred to the PRC. It is interesting that the media was the prerogative of China. S oviet advisers were not allowed either on the radio or in the press, because they viewed the media as «China's internal affair». And soon there was a Great leap, which greatly changed the relationship between Soviet advisors and citizens of the PRC. I t was proclaimed in China as a step towards the prosperity of the state and a breakthrough in development. But the advisers and experts did not accept it.
& quot;When we refused to agree with them that the Great Leap was a good idea, the Chinese side began to arrange these, I would say, obscene things, these huge meetings." Since most of the Great Leap was melting in the «yard ovens», many Soviet experts and experts witnessed how the peasants transferred their dishes and bowlers for use in ovens. One of the advisers, an engineer, investigated the melting process and immediately came to the conclusion that the product from these small ovens was the lowest quality of metal, unsuitable for use and useless for engineering. & quot;It was impossible to tell the Chinese comrades that in this process there was not even a ghost of science." A.I. Elizavetin, a Soviet consul at the Soviet consulate in Shanghai at this time, personally tested many groups of Soviet specialists working in the consulate area. H e also found it difficult to talk with Chinese colleagues during the Great Leap Forward. At each workplace, he appealed to the Chinese leaders with the problems experienced by the advisers when they gave written recommendations to their Chinese counterparts (something they had done for years without problems). T.
he Chinese side carefully recorded what he said, and then «gracefully, in the most gracious terms, they thanked me, saying that they evaluated my statements as fraternal concerns about the needs of China.» Then they continued to say that, since nothing had changed and no results, now the Chinese are «working in the spirit of the Great Leap Forward» and therefore view our recommendations as «the right deviations.» The same thing happened everywhere: acceleration didn’t yield its fruits, but it interfered with the perception of science. A n example may be the case in Guangzhou Province, where the training pilots took place. 45 hours of training were given for training flights. B ut the leadership indicated that Mao’s Great Leap resulted in their pilots taking only twelve hours. Elizavetin said that two Chinese pilots had already crashed and died as a result of the new Maoist policy and that the Chinese then tried to blame the deaths in bad Soviet technologies. Ji Tingxi said that by 1959, most of the cadres knew that there were problems in Sino-Soviet relations. &.
quot;Soviet experts used telephones to communicate with the Soviet Union. A t that time, we installed the listening devices in them. L ater, the Chinese began to complain that it was necessary to return the Soviet advisers because of «moral guilt» or «illegal misconduct» back to the USSR.
M any Soviet advisers and experts believed that their withdrawal from China was connected with the policy of the Great Leap Forward. A dvisers and experts said that the call for faster results «for galloping ahead» began to violate technical regulations and production norms. This was inevitable, since machines and people can not work properly if the production is focused on excessively fast results. S.
oviet officials discovered this during the Stakhanov movement, and the Chinese must have realized this even after importing Stakhanov’s methods in the early 1950s. T he Soviet staff in China worked with their Chinese counterparts as much as they could until Khrushchev decided in mid-July 1960 to recall them. Despite the fact that after 1956 relations with Chinese employees worsened, neither side expected the advisers to be suddenly recalled. T his is rightly reflected in the employee’s memories at the Baotou Steel Mill in Inner Mongolia. C hongxiang, who studied in the Soviet Union in 1954 and graduated from the Moscow Institute of Steel in 1959, was the head of the plant in Baotou. He and another 41 Chinese technical workers and workers arrived in the USSR to study nuclear production. I.
n Moscow he said: «The Soviets were very friendly, serious, passionate, unconditional with us, even in the summer they organized an excursion along the Volga.» In April 1960, more than 30 Soviet advisers arrived in Baotou to help build and train Chinese workers and technicians. T hen in August they heard that the Soviet staff had to immediately return to the USSR. In a few months, most of the Soviet advisers, experts, specialists, consultants and teachers left China, many of them took with them their drawings, plans and working papers. C.
hinese leaders were «shocked and furious», realizing that the sudden withdrawal of Soviet advisers and experts could damage the Chinese economy. M any large and important projects immediately ceased. T.
hus, one can take into account the fact that the activities of Soviet specialists in China have not been fully realized. ConclusionTransnational practice, which allowed the formation of a mass «migration» of Soviet experience, culture and personnel to China, was one of the most intriguing phenomena in China’s quest for modernity. S ince the beginning of the nineteenth century, when China was involved in the reorganized world system, China’s desire to join the overall process was at the top of the national agenda. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the «Self-reinforcing movement» attempted to revive the decreasing empire of Qing, establishing Western military and technological innovations. F.
rom the turn of the twentieth century to the communist seizure of the mainland in 1949, especially after May 4, 1915, a large number of Russian and Soviet literary works, songs and films were translated into Chinese along with the introduction of Western science, democracy and culture. This cultural activity has largely remained an unofficial attempt by a number of intellectuals and social activists seeking to educate and revive the nation. A fter the founding of the PRC until 1963 (a year before the open controversy between the two countries), a large number of Soviet cultural forms were introduced into the PRC in large numbers with the support of Mao’s policies. Thus, the Soviet Union has become the main supplier of Chinese socialist cultural products, which constitute the majority of foreign cultural values of New China. D espite the dramatic changes in lifestyles and mass culture that occurred over the decades after the 1950s, it was this first step in modernization that set the tone for future changes.
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