In 2015, compared to 2014, this discrepancy decreased by 15.
2% to 11.9 billion US dollars, while its relative size increased by 0.7 percentage points. up to 3,6%. In 2016, compared with the previous year, the positive difference in Russia’s export data and «mirror» imports of the rest of the world decreased 6.6 times and amounted to just over 1.8 billion US dollars, or 0.
6% in relative terms.
A comparison of the value of Russia’s exports for 2016 with the import of a group of most important countries-trade partners as a whole testifies to the absence of significant relative differences-0.
1% (versus 6.
0% in 2015). At the same time, a comparative analysis of data in the context of individual countries shows that in most cases, following the continued reduction in the cost of export-import transactions, the corresponding absolute values ββof statistical discrepancies also decreased.
Stable positive discrepancies, when Russia’s exports exceed the volume of imports, are traditionally recorded on trade transactions with the Netherlands (in 2016 they amounted to 10.0 billion US dollars), Latvia (3.9 billion US dollars), Malta (2.2 billion ($ 1.9 billion), the United Kingdom ($ 1.7 billion), Switzerland ($ 1.4 billion), Estonia ($ 1.2 billion), Italy (0.9 billion US dollars), India (0.8 billion US dollars) and Israel (0.6 billion US dollars). In this case, compared with the previous year in transactions with the United Kingdom, the positive discrepancies increased 1.6 times, with Switzerland — by 36.
5%. At the same time, the positive difference with Italy declined by 87.
4%, the Netherlands by 53.
7%, India by 41.
0%, the Republic of Korea by 34.
1%, Latvia by 34.
0%, Israel — by 32.
0%, Malta by 10.
3% and Estonia by 5.
9%. In addition, deviations in favor of Russia’s exports in trade with Cyprus grew by 1.8 times, Ireland by 8.
1%, while with Croatia fell by 51.
2% and Hong Kong by 27.
3%. The negative differences observed between 2010 and 2015 in the data of mutual trade with the Czech Republic and Hungary were replaced in 2016 by positive deviations of $ 0.5 and $ 0.2 billion, respectively.
Among the countries whose data on imports from Russia regularly and on a large scale exceed mirror Russian data, the United States of America ($ 4.4 billion), China ($ 4.0 billion), Germany (3.8 million US dollars) billion US dollars), Belgium ($ 2.1 billion), Poland ($ 1.6 billion), Sweden ($ 1.4 billion), Spain and Japan ($ 1.3 billion each), Lithuania ($ 1.1 billion) and Austria ($ 1.0 billion). Compared to 2015, negative discrepancies with Poland decreased by 55.
8%, Sweden by 29.
4%, the United States by 28.
7%, Lithuania by 26.
3%, Germany by 13.
4% China — 11.
1%, Belgium — 10.
7% and Austria — 5.
6%, while with Japan rose 3.6 times, Spain — 1.6 times. In addition, a significant negative difference in the data of mutual trade with Bulgaria in the amount of 1.4 billion US dollars registered in the previous year was reduced by 91.
8% to $ 0.1 billion in 2016, in relative terms — from 43, 1 to 4.
9%.
The reduction in the positive deviation of Russia’s exports from the corresponding aggregate imports of the CIS countries continued: in 2016, compared to 2015, its value decreased from $ 1.2 billion to $ 0.3 billion, the relative size of the discrepancy decreased from 2, 7 to 0.
8% respectively.
Compared to the previous year, positive differences in trade data with Ukraine decreased by one third to $ 1.2 billion, with Armenia — by 62.
0% to $ 0.1 billion. At the same time, the positive difference in the data of mutual trade with Kazakhstan, as well as a year earlier, was 0.3 billion US dollars. The excess of Russia’s exports over the «mirror» imports of Azerbaijan in the amount of 0.8 billion US dollars, which was observed in 2015, was replaced in 2016 by a negative divergence of $ 0.1 billion. And on the contrary, the transition from an insignificant negative difference of $ 7 million to the positive difference of $ 214 million was noted in Kyrgyzstan.
In 2016, the negative discrepancy in the data with Belarus was 1.1 billion US dollars, having decreased by 0.6 billion US dollars compared to the previous year, or by 36.
8%. The negative difference with Tajikistan, as in 2015, remained at the level of $ 0.2 billion, but its relative size increased from 19.0 to 25.
3%.
The period of 2013;2016 was characterized by a gradual reduction in the negative difference in the rates of imports of goods to Russia and exports of the rest of the world: in 2013, its value in absolute terms amounted to 18.1 billion US dollars, declining in 2014 to 16, 1 billion US dollars (decrease of 10.
7%), in 2015 — up to 5.4 billion US dollars (66.
9%) and in 2016 — up to 3.3 billion US dollars (39.
0%). A similar trend was also observed in the dynamics of relative deviations, which in the period under review were fixed at 5.6, 5.5, 3.0 and 1.
8%, respectively.
The high total «shortage» of imports, as in previous periods, was noted in trade with the European Union. In 2016, it amounted to 14.4 billion US dollars, which is 1.4 billion US dollars (8.
8%) less than the previous year. At the same time, the relative level of differences decreased from 23.8 to 21.
8%.
The total export of partners from the CIS countries in 2016 exceeded the supply of goods to Russia by 0.8 billion US dollars, which is by 0.5 billion US dollars (2.4 times) more than the same indicator in 2015. Such dynamics is caused by outstripping rates of decline in positive deviations, which in the analyzed period in relation to these trade with Ukraine decreased by 64.
6% (from 0.8 to 0.3 billion US dollars), Azerbaijan — by 62.
9% (from 100 to 37 million US dollars) and Kazakhstan — by 21.
9% (from 0.3 to 0.2 billion US dollars). At the same time, the negative difference in mirror data from Belarus decreased by 0.1 to 1.3 billion US dollars, or 4.
9%. The total «shortage» of imports relative to the supply of goods from Armenia and Tajikistan in the aggregate decreased by 9.
5% and did not exceed $ 0.1 billion. The negative gap in trade data with Kyrgyzstan of $ 0.1 billion in 2016, reversed in 2015, was replaced by a slight positive deviation of $ 12 million.
Conclusion.
Thus, we can draw the following conclusions.
The Russian economy has two basic problems: risks that are disproportionate to income generation opportunities, and overregulation.
The most primitive (but very correct) model of the economy says that growth occurs where entrepreneurs and investors see a positive difference between the level of expected revenues and the level of expected risks from investing or starting projects (leave aside the model of the state economy, the development of which goes without dependence from incomes and risks, simply because know in practice: the state economy can not under any circumstances provide sustainable balanced growth).
Thus, for the growth of the economy, it is necessary that either the potential incomes are high enough (as occurs in very poor countries, there from the low base the growth is very fast, because the unmet demand is high — this was the case in Russia as well, because the flows of petrodollars brought high incomes and the illusion of a speedy liberalization of the economy remained), or the risks of doing business significantly decreased. In these conditions, the capital itself begins to go into the country and entrepreneurs are assimilating new investments, while the market with minimum government assistance in the form of reasonable regulation is able to identify points of growth.
Current trends in the development of the financial situation at the global level are associated with the relative strengthening of the world’s leading currencies (primarily the US dollar), with the outflow of financial resources from emerging markets. Sanctions aggravate this situation for Russia, but do not change its essence.
Over the past decade and a half, only during the extremely short period of 2004;2007. Russia had a negative net international investment position. That is, during most of modern economic history, Russia is a creditor of the «rest of the world». Of course, the period when Russia acted as a borrower on the world financial market is the most successful period of economic development in Russia. Nevertheless, the situation with a positive international investment position is quite familiar for the Russian economy.
In the macroeconomic context, the situation with servicing the Russian external debt under sanctions is absolutely not critical, although at the micro level there are problems of individual borrowers. That is, with proper organization of financial redistribution the situation remains quite manageable. Since the main «debtors» for international obligations are primarily companies and banks controlled by the state, financial redistribution problems are completely solvable. At the same time, it is worth noting that the real practice of solving relevant problems by the Russian monetary authorities is far from ideal.
The revaluation of international assets and liabilities of Russian economic agents has had a greater effect than their operations. In many respects this thesis corresponds with the statement that the result was determined not so much by sanctions and conjuncture of the world market, as by the economic policy pursued. At the same time, the withdrawal of resources by residents is no less significant from the point of view of the impact on Russia’s international investment position, rather than the outflow of non-resident funds.
Three main directions of the restrictive impact of sanctions and worsening of the world market situation can be singled out: investment investment financing, financing of current foreign trade operations, refinancing of domestic credit.
The large-scale replacement of financial resources of the world market in terms of financing investment imports is very problematic: the capacity of the Russian financial system is clearly insufficient. Accordingly, preferences in the development of import-substitution are, in our opinion, in this sphere.
Financing of current foreign economic relations is not so problematic: it is relatively more expensive, there is additional uncertainty, volatility increases — but nevertheless there are no critical problems. There are only questions to the quality of spontaneous import substitution in this sphere, stimulated by appreciation and uncertainty of imports and conducted without proper investments.
Replacing the world market in terms of refinancing domestic credit is a theoretically quite solvable task, requiring a certain reorientation of the monetary policy of monetary authorities. The problem here is that this task «does not fit» into the current monetary policy of the Russian monetary authorities.
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